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Evidence	 shows	 that	 manipulating	 the	 expressive	 component	 of	 fear	 can	 influence	 the	
processing	 of	 emotional	 information.	 Participants	 unobtrusively	 produced	 the	 expressive	
behaviors	 typical	 of	 fear,	 anger	 or	 happiness.	 Participants	 producing	 the	 expression	 of	
fear	 were	 faster	 at	 classifying	 verbal	 material	 with	 emotional	 content	 than	 participants	
producing	the	expressions	of	happiness	or	anger.	These	effects	were	especially	pronounced	
for	participants	who	were	generally	sensitive	to	their	own	bodily	cues,	as	indicated	by	their	





Emotional	 processes	 are	 fundamentally	 “embodied.”	 Bodily	 processes	 such	
as	 expressive	 behaviors	 and	 physiological	 changes	 are	 central	 components	 of	
the	 subjective	 experience	 of	 emotion.	 Following	William	 James	 (1890),	many	
modern	theories	of	emotion	go	further	and	propose	that	bodily	activities	are	the	
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indeed	 support	 the	 notion	 that	 feeling	 states	 can	 be	 induced	 by	 changes	 in	
people’s	 bodily	 activities.	 For	 example,	 people	 who	 adopt	 facial	 expressions	
of	emotions	often	report	feeling	the	corresponding	emotion	(e.g.,	Duclos	et	al.,	
1989;	Laird,	1974),	and	these	effects	can	persist	over	extended	periods	of	time	
(Schnall	&	Laird,	2003).	Similarly,	 adopting	a	posture	can	 result	 in	 emotional	
feelings,	such	as	fear,	anger,	or	sadness	(Duclos	et	al.,	1989).	
However,	 some	 of	 this	work	 has	 been	 criticized	 for	 relying	 on	 self-reports,	
and	for	being	confounded	by	experimental	demand	characteristics	(Tourangeau	
&	Ellsworth,	1979).	Furthermore,	although	effects	of	emotional	expressions	on	
subjective	 feelings	have	been	documented	extensively,	 it	 is	unclear	as	 to	what	
extent	 specific	 emotional	 expressions	 influence	 the	 cognitive	 processing	 of	
emotional	content.	
The	cognitive	consequences	of	 fear	and	anxiety	have	been	well	documented	
(Mathews	 &	 MacLeod,	 1994).	 Chronic	 states	 of	 anxiety	 are	 associated	 with	
heightened	 sensitivity	 to	 fear-relevant	 information,	 including	 threatening	
information	 (MacLeod	 &	 Mathews,	 1988;	 Richards	 &	 French,	 1992),	 and	
generally	emotional	information	(Fox,	Russo,	&	Dutton,	2002;	Martin,	Williams,	
&	Clark,	1991).	Whereas	 this	cognitive	bias	has	been	repeatedly	demonstrated	
for	 clinically	 anxious	 samples,	 the	 findings	 have	 been	 less	 conclusive	 when	
inducing	temporary	states	of	fear	in	nonclinical	samples.	For	example,	Riemann	
and	McNally	 (1995)	 induced	 elation	 and	 anxiety	 using	 a	 film,	 and	 presented	






Barsalou,	 Winkielman,	 Krauth-Gruber,	 &	 Ric,	 2005)	 have	 suggested	 that	
simulating	 certain	 aspects	 of	 an	 experience	 (e.g.,	 the	 expressive	 behavior	 of	
an	 emotion)	 can	 invoke	 the	 cognitive	 concept	 of	 that	 experience.	 Thus,	 we	
tested	whether	 or	 not	 a	 fearful	 expression	 can	 produce	 some	 of	 the	 cognitive	
consequences	of	fear.	
Reaction	 time	 tasks	 requiring	 fast	 responses	are	often	used	 to	assess	aspects	
of	 cognitive	 processing	 that	 are	 not	 accessible	 to	 self-reports.	 For	 example,	
modifications	of	 the	classic	Stroop	 task	have	demonstrated	 that	people	exhibit	
attentional	 biases	 towards	 noncolor	 words	 that	 are	 personally	 meaningful.	
Specifically,	patients	with	emotional	disorders	 show	greater	 response	 latencies	






psycholinguistic	 studies	 to	 capture	 attentional	 biases	 toward	 certain	 types	 of	
information	(e.g.,	Meyer	&	Schvaneveldt,	1971).
In	 the	 current	 study,	 performance	 on	 a	 sentence	 classification	 task	 was	
compared	for	participants	producing	expressions	of	 fear,	happiness,	and	anger.	
The	 stimuli	 were	 word-strings	 forming	 emotional	 sentences	 (related	 to	 fear,	










Previous	 research	 has	 demonstrated	 individual	 differences	 in	 the	 degree	 to	
which	 people’s	 emotions	 are	 “embodied.”	 For	 example,	 some	 people	 report	
feeling	happy	when	 they	are	 induced	 to	put	on	a	smile,	whereas	others	do	not	
(Laird	 &	 Crosby,	 1974).	 This	 difference	 in	 response	 to	 bodily	 cues	 is	 stable	
over	 time	and	consistent	across	a	wide	variety	of	behaviors	and	 feelings	 (e.g.,	
Schnall,	 Abrahamson,	 &	 Laird,	 2002;	 Schnall	 &	 Laird,	 2003).	 To	 provide	 a	
measure	of	 individual	differences	 in	bodily	sensitivity	 that	was	 independent	of	
facial	expressions,	we	assessed	field-dependence.	In	general,	individuals	who	are	
field-dependent	rely	on	contextual	cues	from	the	situation,	outside	their	bodies,	
whereas	 individuals	 who	 are	 field-independent	 rely	 more	 on	 internal,	 bodily	
cues.	 Earlier	 research	 has	 shown	 that	 field-independent	 individuals	 are	 more	
responsive	to	manipulations	of	their	facial	expressions	(Duncan	&	Laird,	1977).	
The	Rod-and-Frame	Task	 (Witkin	&	Asch,	 1948)	 is	 one	of	 the	most	 common	
measures	of	field-dependence.	For	this	task,	the	participant	sits	in	a	completely	
dark	 room	 and	 is	 presented	 with	 a	 luminous	 rod	 surrounded	 by	 a	 luminous	
frame	 tilted	 to	 the	 left	 or	 to	 the	 right.	 The	 rod	 can	 be	 moved	 independently	
from	the	frame,	and	the	participant’s	task	is	to	adjust	the	rod	to	make	it	appear	
completely	 vertical.	 Field-dependence	 is	measured	 as	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	
participant	either	relies	on	external	cues	from	the	contextual	frame,	rather	than	






Overall,	 the	 objective	 was	 to	 investigate	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 expressive	
behavior	 of	 fear	 on	 emotional	 information	 processing,	 which	 could	 result	 in	
either	 a	 specific	 effect	 for	 fear-relevant	 information,	 or	 a	 general	 effect	 for	





















The	 stimuli	 consisted	 of	 12	 metaphors	 each	 describing	 fear	 (e.g.,	 “she	
was	 frozen	 in	 her	 tracks”),	 happiness	 (e.g.,	 “she	was	 flying	 high”)	 and	 anger	
(e.g.,	 “he	 flew	 off	 the	 handle”),	 selected	 from	 linguistic	 studies	 of	 metaphor	





feeling	 angry,	 are	 hypothesized	 to	 reflect	 physiological	 changes	 during	 those	




All	metaphors	 were	 pretested	 to	 ensure	 comprehensibility,	 and	matched	 for	
number	 of	 letters,	 sentence	 length	 and	 word	 frequencies.	 For	 standardization	
purposes,	 all	 expressions	 were	 transformed	 into	 third-person,	 past	 tense	
statements.	Sentences	had	the	basic	form	of	“pronoun	(he/she)	+	verb	+	object.”	
Twelve	 neutral	 nonmetaphorical	 sentences	 were	 constructed	 by	 replacing	 one	
word	of	an	emotion	metaphor	with	a	word	of	equal	or	higher	word	frequency.	
For	instance,	“she	snapped	at	him”	(anger	metaphor)	was	transformed	into	“she	
glanced	 at	 him”	 (control	 sentence).	 Thus,	 there	 were	 48	 different	 stimuli:	 36	







of	 cranial	 nerve	 activity	 on	 cognition.”	 Instructions	 indicated	 that	 contracting	
certain	muscles	would	activate	the	cranial	nerve	system,	and	as	a	consequence,	
might	improve	cognitive	functioning.	
After	 providing	 informed	 consent	 and	 some	 demographic	 information,	
participants	filled	out	a	list	of	emotion	rating	scales	for	a	baseline	measurement	
of	emotional	feelings.	Items	on	the	scale	were	relaxed, angry, happy, sad, afraid, 
depressed, upset,	 and	 confused,	 and	 each	 had	 a	 4¼-inch-long	 line	 next	 to	 it,	
labeled	don’t feel at all	 and	 feel very strongly	 at	 either	 end.	 Participants	were	
asked	to	describe	their	feelings	at	the	moment	by	marking	an	“X”	on	the	part	of	
the	line	that	best	described	how	strongly	each	emotion	was	felt.	
Participants	 were	 then	 presented	 with	 word-strings	 on	 the	 computer	 and	









the	 computer	 beginning	with	 the	 onset	 of	 each	 phrase,	 and	measurement	was	
terminated	once	the	participant	pressed	the	correct	button.	
Each	participant	 first	 received	12	practice	 sentences	 to	get	 familiar	with	 the	
procedure.	After	 this	 practice	 trial	 block,	 the	 participant	was	 informed	 that	 in	
order	to	improve	performance	on	the	task,	certain	cranial	nerve	exercises	would	
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be	 performed.	 The	 experimenter	 read	 the	 instructions	 to	 the	 participant	 and	
pointed	out	specific	muscles	on	an	anatomical	chart	while	monitoring	whether	
the	correct	muscle	contractions	were	produced.	Instructions	for	the	contractions	
were	 based	 on	 previous	 studies	 (e.g.,	 Duclos	 et	 al.,	 1989;	 Schnall	 &	 Laird,	
2003),	and	were	given	until	the	participant	succeeded	at	producing	the	desired	
expressions.	
For	 the	 “Fear”	 expression,	 instructions	 were	 to	 raise	 the	 eyebrows	 while	
moving	 the	head	back,	 and	 letting	 the	mouth	 relax	and	hang	open	a	 little.	To	
accomplish	a	 fearful	posture,	participants	were	asked	 to	 sit	 at	 the	edge	of	 the	





























judged	 its	 position	 to	 be	 completely	 vertical.	 Twelve	 counterbalanced	 trials	
were	administered,	and	deviations	(measured	in	degrees)	from	the	vertical	were	
recorded.	Finally,	 in	 a	postexperimental	 questionnaire	participants	were	 asked	
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edge	 of	 the	 box	 were	 excluded.	 Because	 the	 resulting	 scores	 were	 roughly	
normally	distributed	and	no	natural	break	point	was	identified	by	inspecting	the	








sentences	were	used	as	a	covariate	 in	 the	analysis.	To	 justify	 this,	an	ANOVA	
with	 Expression	 Condition	 (Fear,	 Happiness,	Anger)	 as	 independent	 variable	
and	control	sentences	as	dependent	variable	confirmed	that	the	three	expression	




subjects	 factor,	 control	 sentences	 as	 covariate,	 and	 expression	 condition	 (fear,	
happiness,	anger)	and	field-dependence	as	between-subjects	factors.	




faster	 than	 the	 happiness	 condition,	F(1,	 55)	 =	 4.69,	 p	 <	 .03,	 and	 the	 anger	
condition,	F(1,	55)	=	4.95,	p	<	.03,	whereas	the	reaction	times	in	the	latter	two	
conditions	did	not	differ	(p	>	.95).	




p	 <	 .0001.	 Finally,	 there	 was	 a	 significant	 interaction	 for	 Field-Dependence	
and	Metaphor	Type,	F(2,	 112)	 =	 3.00,	p	 <	 .05,	 and	 a	marginal	 interaction	 of	
Condition	and	Metaphor	Type,	F(4,	112)	=	2.28,	p	<	.07.	There	was	no	three-way	
interaction	for	Field-Dependence,	Condition	and	Metaphor	Type.
The	 prediction	 that	 field-independent	 individuals	 show	 more	 pronounced	
effects	 of	 the	 experimental	manipulation	was	 then	 tested	 using	 simple	 effects	
analyses,	as	recommended	by	Keppel	(1991,	p.	112).	Indeed,	field-independent	
participants	in	the	fear	expression	condition	(M	=	3.18,	SD =	.14	log	ms)	were	






Thus,	 we	 found	 that	 producing	 the	 bodily	 expressions	 associated	with	 fear	
led	 to	 a	more	 rapid	 processing	 of	 sentences	 not	 only	 related	 to	 fear,	 but	 also	




























Schnall	&	Laird,	 2003),	 the	 effect	was	 especially	 pronounced	 for	 individuals	
who	generally	rely	on	bodily	cues,	namely	field-independent	participants.	







self-repOrts Of emOtIOnal feelIngs
Pre-	and	posttest	ratings	of	emotional	feelings	were	examined	for	changes	in	
reported	feelings	with	repeated-measures	ANOVAs	with	pre-	and	posttest	rating	
for	 each	 emotion	 adjective,	 and	 Expression	 Condition	 and	 Field-Dependence	
as	 factors.	Contrary	 to	 expectation,	 there	was	 no	 significant	 interaction	 effect	
for	 reported	 changes	 in	 ratings	 of	 feeling	 afraid	 and	 Expression	 Condition,	
F(2,	55)	=	.43,	p	<	.66,	nor	a	three-way	interaction	of	Feeling,	Expression	and	












Several	 additional	 aspects	 of	 the	 findings	 are	 noteworthy.	 First,	 the	 effects	
were	specific	to	the	fear	expression	condition,	and	did	not	extend	to	the	anger	
expression	condition.	Thus,	it	was	not	the	case	that	any	kind	of	negative	bodily	
expression	 resulted	 in	 a	 cognitive	 bias.	 Second,	 no	 changes	 in	 participants’	




states.	 Field-independent	 individuals	 showed	 a	 more	 pronounced	 facilitation	
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effect	 of	 the	 fearful	 expression	 than	 did	 field-dependent	 individuals.	 Thus,	
consistent	with	 previous	 studies,	 it	 seems	 some	 people	 pay	more	 attention	 to	
their	own	bodily	cues	and	are	more	influenced	by	experimental	manipulations	
of	those	bodily	cues	(Schnall	&	Laird,	2003).	
the rOle Of feelIngs
At	a	first	glance	it	seems	surprising	that	there	was	no	evidence	for	a	mediating	
role	 of	 subjective	 feelings	 on	 effects	 of	 information	 processing.	 Participants’	
self-reports	before	and	after	the	experimental	manipulation	did	not	differ.	More	
specifically,	participants	in	the	fear	expression	condition	did	not	report	feeling	




How	 can	 this	 apparent	 discrepancy	 be	 explained?	 Perhaps	 the	 effects	were	
not	 due	 to	 induced	 feelings,	 but	 instead	 were	 caused	 directly	 by	 the	 bodily	
expressions.	 Indeed,	 some	 authors	 argue	 that	 affective	 expressions,	 as	 one	
instantiation	 of	 affect,	 can	 have	 similar	 cognitive	 consequences	 as	 other	
affective	 cues	 (Clore	 &	 Colcombe,	 2003).	 Supportive	 evidence	 comes	 from	








As	 noted	 earlier,	 we	 used	 “embodied”	 metaphors	 with	 the	 objective	 of	
investigating	 whether	 or	 not	 manipulating	 embodied	 emotional	 expressions	






framework	of	 this	 embodied	perspective	 and	borrowed	 the	 assumptions	of	 an	
embodied	 approach	 to	 cognition	 and	 its	 metaphorical	 expressions.	We	 found	
experimental	 evidence	 that	online	emotional	processing,	objectively	measured	
by	reaction	times	rather	than	self-reports,	can	be	influenced	by	a	person’s	bodily	
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